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Capital allocation decisions are made on the basis of an assessment of creditwor-
thiness. Default is a rare event for most segments of a bank's portfolio and data
information can be minimal. Inference about default rates is essential for ecient
capital allocation, for risk management and for compliance with the requirements
of the Basel II rules on capital standards for banks. Expert information is crucial
in inference about defaults. A Bayesian approach is proposed and illustrated using
prior distributions assessed from industry experts. A maximum entropy approach is
used to represent expert information. The binomial model, most common in appli-
cations, is extended to allow correlated defaults yet remain consistent with Basel II.
The application shows that probabilistic information can be elicited from experts
and econometric methods can be useful even when data information is sparse.
Keywords: Bayesian inference, Basel II, risk management, prior elicitation,
small probability estimation1 Introduction
The eciency of resource allocation in a modern economy depends crucially on the
quality of numerous decentralized decisions on credit allocation. These decisions de-
pend on inference about small probabilities, where data information can be sparse
but expert information is clearly available. Large, internationally active banks must
follow internationally negotiated guidelines. The Basel II (B2) framework (Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (2006)) for calculating minimum capital re-
quirements provides for banks to use models to assess credit (and other) risks. All
aspects of these models { specication, estimation, validation { will have to meet
the scrutiny of national supervisors. These models should be the same ones that
sophisticated institutions use to manage their loan portfolios. Banks using internal
ratings-based (IRB) methods to calculate credit risks must calculate default prob-
abilities (PD), loss given default (LGD), exposure at default (EAD) and eective
maturity (M) for groups of homogeneous assets. It can be argued that of these PD is
the most important. For very safe assets or for newly-developed assets calculations
based on historical data and the frequency estimator may be problematic since few
defaults are observed. Estimation of small probabilities has attracted considerable
recent attention; see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), BBA, LIBA,
and ISDA (2005), Kiefer (forthcoming) and Pluto and Tasche (2005). Midportfolio
asset groups, for which default is still a rare event, typically have some default ex-
perience and larger sample sizes. These groups can support models allowing simple
forms of default dependence. Expert information remains important.
I focus here on incorporating expert information in estimating the default proba-
bility  for well-dened portfolio segments. Uncertainty about the default probabil-
ity should be modeled the same way as uncertainty about defaults { represented in
a probability distribution. A future default either occurs or doesn't (given the de-
nition). Since we do not know in advance whether default occurs or not, we model
this uncertain event with a probability distribution. This model re
ects partial
knowledge of the default mechanism. Similarly, the default probability is unknown.
But there is some information available about  in addition to the data information.
The simple fact that loans are made shows that some risk assessment is occurring.
This information should be organized and incorporated in the analysis in a sensible
way, specically represented in a probability distribution. It can be shown that
beliefs that satisfy certain consistency requirements, for example that the believer
1is unwilling to make sure-loss bets, lead to measures of uncertainty that combine
according to the laws of probability: convexity, additivity and multiplication. See
for example DeGroot (1970). This information should be combined with data in-
formation as represented in the relevant likelihood function. This combination of
information is easy to do once the information is represented in probability distri-
butions. The nal distribution should represent both data and expert information
about the default probability.
Much eort in theoretical econometrics is currently devoted to methods for ex-
tracting data information with minimal assumptions. This approach is appealing
when there is a great deal of informative data, as illustrated by the fact that most
results available and sought are asymptotic. However there is a large class of im-
portant practical problems for which there are some, but not much data and there
are also experts whose experience and knowledge is relevant. Despite the lack of
conclusive data evidence, decisions must be made. In many applied settings profes-
sional judgment is expected and discussed at the same level as the statistical model
(which is a result of judgment) or the relevance of the data (more judgment). For
example judges have guidelines on how to determine whether someone should be
admitted as an expert and how much weight to give to the expert's information.
This inference situation is dicult for economists due perhaps to the ambiguity
surrounding the way in which expert and data information are combined. Much
of this uncomfortable ambiguity can be eliminated by adopting a formal Bayesian
approach. Once expert information is cast in terms of probabilities, then analysis
proceeds simply by applying the rules of probability. In this approach the econome-
trician is faced with two modeling tasks. The rst is the familiar task of specifying
the likelihood function. The second is specifying the expert information, usually
consisting of a limited number of assessments, in terms of a statistical distribution.
This paper illustrates the use of informative priors in an important applied set-
ting. Explicit use of informative priors is rarely seen in economic applications,
though prior or expert information is crucial in any modeling application, including
nonparametric applications - see the vivid examples in Dufour, Jouneau-Sion, and
Torrs (2007). The quest for objectivity has eliminated the language of prior infor-
mation, but simply consider that likelihood functions are not handed to us. At an
even more basic level, consider the choice of the covariate list. Bayesian applica-
tions in economics are often conducted using objective priors, which yield some of
the advantages of the Bayesian approach, most specically a type of logical consis-
2tency and access to powerful computational techniques such as MCMC (see Robert
and Casella (2004) and Geweke (2005)) for inference. However the real power of the
Bayesian approach is the ability to combine information from all sources coherently.
This is especially important when no single source of information dominates. For
example, if the data information is overwhelming, there is little gain from precise
assessment of a prior; similarly, if there are no data, prior elicitation (perhaps under
another name) becomes crucial.
The diculty in applying the Bayesian approach is that unfamiliar thinking is
required. It is not easy to quantify the information or, alternatively, the uncer-
tainty about . Quantication of uncertainty requires comparison with a standard.
One standard for measuring uncertainty is a simple conceptual experiment, such as
drawing balls from an urn at random as above, or sequences of coin 
ips. We might
begin by dening events for consideration. Examples of events are A = "  0:005";
"B = "  0:01"; C = "  0:015;"etc. Assign probabilities by comparison. For
example A is about as likely as seeing three heads in 50 throws of a fair coin. Some-
times it is easier to assign probabilities by considering the relative likelihoods of
events and their complements. Thus, either A or "not A" must occur. Some prefer
to recast this assessment in terms of betting. Thus, the payout x is received if A oc-
curs, (1 x) if not. Again, the events are exhaustive and mutually exclusive. Adjust
x until you are indierent between betting on A and "not A." Then, it is reasonable
to assume for small bets that xP(A) = (1 x)(1 P(A)) or P(A) = (1 x). These
possibilities and others are discussed in Berger (1980). Thinking about uncertainty
in terms of probabilities requires eort and practice (possibly explaining why it is
so rarely done). Nevertheless it can be done once experts are convinced it is worth-
while. Indeed, there is experimental evidence in game settings that elicited beliefs
about opponents' future actions are better explanations of responses than empirical
beliefs - Cournot or ctitious play - based on weighted averages of previous actions.
For details see Nyarko and Schotter (2002). O'Hagan, Buck, Daneshkhah, Eiser,
Garthwaite, Jenkinson, Oakley, and Rakow (2006) discusses elicitation techniques
and several applications.
As a practical matter a rather small set of assessments is used as the basis for
tting a probability distribution matching these assessments as well as possible.
Just as the data distribution is specied in terms of a small number of parameters
which imply a complete distribution, so the prior is based on a small number of
assessments. It is important to verify that the specied prior actually describes be-
3liefs well, just as it is important to check that the specied parametric data density
describes the data well. In the case of the prior, we t the initial assessments, then
return to the expert if practical to explore additional implications of the specica-
tion and obtain additional assessed characteristics if appropriate. In the case of the
data density, we examine residuals, etc. and consider respecication and possibly
additional data. The approach taken here is to choose the maximum entropy repre-
sentation of the assessed prior information. This approach species the prior which
imposes as little information as possible in addition to the assessments. Formally,
information is measured with entropy.
Section 2 discusses the statistical model for defaults. Section 3 concerns the
prior distribution for defaults in a low-default portfolio elicited from an experienced
industry expert. A maximum entropy representation is used to provide a statistical
description of the properties elicited from the expert. Section 4 turns to inference
and the posterior distributions are obtained for a hypothetical but representative
sample. For this problem, samples with zero or one default are the norm. Section
5 concerns prior elicitation and representation for a mid-portfolio group of assets
(using a dierent expert). Section 6 reports results using a sample of non-nancial
corporate bonds. Section 7 considers using the posterior distribution for inference
on minimum required capital, although it is not clear this approach will satisfy the
relevant supervisors. Section 8 concludes.
2 A Statistical Model for Defaults
The simplest and most common probability model for defaults of assets in a homoge-
neous segment of a portfolio is the Binomial, in which the defaults are independent
across assets and over time, and defaults occur with common probability : This
is the most widely used specication in practice and may be consistent with B2
requirements calling for a long-run average default probability. Note that specica-
tion of this or any other model requires expert judgement. The Basel prescription
is for a marginal annual default probability, thus many discussions of the inference
issue have focussed on the binomial model and the associated frequency estimator.
The requirements demand an annual default probability, estimated over a sample
long enough to cover a full cycle of economic conditions. Thus the probability
should be marginal with respect to external conditions. Perhaps this marginaliza-
tion can be achieved within the binomial specication by averaging over the sample
4period. Let di indicate whether the ith observation was a default (di = 1) or not
(di = 0). The Bernoulli model (a single Binomial trial) for the distribution of diis
p(dij) = di(1   )1 di. Let D = fdi;i = 1;:::;ng denote the whole data set and
r = r(D) =
P










As a function of  for given data D this is the likelihood function L(jD): Since
this distribution depends on the data D only through r (n is regarded as xed), the










Consideration of an underlying model for asset values leads to a simple but
useful extension of the Binomial model. Suppose the value of the ith asset in time
t is
vit = it
where it is the time and asset specic shock and default occurs if vit < d; a default
threshold value. A mean of zero is attainable through translation without loss
of generality since we are only interested in default probabilities. We assume the
shock is standard normal. The default rate we are interested in is  = (d);our
Binomial parameter. This simple specication may be adequate for very low-default
portfolios, where asset homogeneity within a group is unlikely to be inconsistent
with the data. However, the Basel II guidance suggests there may be remaining
heterogeneity, due to systematic temporal changes in asset characteristics or to
changing macroeconomic conditions. There is some evidence from other markets
that default probabilities vary over the cycle. See Nickell, Perraudin, and Varotto
(2000) and Das, Due, Kapadia, and Saita (2007). The B2 capital requirements are
based on a one-factor model due to Gordy (2003) that accommodates systematic
temporal variation in asset values and hence in default probabilities. This model
can be used as the basis of a model that allows temporal variation in the default
probabilities, and hence correlated defaults within years. The value of the ith asset
5in time t is modeled as
vit = 
1=2xt + (1   )
1=2it (3)
where it is the time and asset specic shock (as above) and xt is a common time
shock, inducing correlation  across asset values within a period. The random vari-
ables are assumed to be standard normal and independent. The overall or marginal
default rate we are interested in is  = (d): However, in each period the default
rate depends on the realization of the systematic factor xt; denote this t: The model
implies a distribution for t: Specically, the distribution of vit conditional on xt is
N(1=2xt;1   ): Hence the period t default probability is
t = [(d   
1=2xt)=(1   )
1=2] (4)
Thus for  6= 0 there is random variation in the default probability over time and
this induces correlation in defaults across assets within a period. The distribution
is given by
Pr(t  A) = Pr([(d   
1=2xt)=(1   )
1=2]  A)





using the standard normal distribution of xt and  = (d): Dierentiating gives
the density p(tj;). This is known as the Vasicek distribution. The parameters
are ; the marginal or mean default probability, for which we have already assessed
a prior, and the asset correlation : Values for  are in fact prescribed in B2 as a
function of the overall default probability . There is very little data evidence on 
so we defer to the B2 formulas for corporate, sovereign and bank exposures (Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (2006) page 78) and set
() = 0:24   0:12(1   e
 50): (5)
This simple formula is obtained from the more complicated expression in B2 by
omitting a factor of 1=(1 e 50) which diers from 1 in the 22nd decimal place and
arguably should not be cluttering up the formula anyway. The factor is omitted from
the US Final Rule (OCC, FRS, FDIC, and OTS (2007)). Note that the conditional
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where we have used p(tj;) = p(tj) due to the restriction 5. The distribution





where we condition on (n1;:::;nT): Regarded as a function of  for xed R, 6 is the
likelihood function.
This one-factor model for asset value and hence default correlation is quite simple
but it does have empirical support. Recall that the techniques here are applied
to "buckets" of homogeneous assets. In a study of nonnancial and nonutility
corporate bonds, Das, Due, Kapadia, and Saita (2007) examine the suitablilty of
a model based on correlation determined by observable factors (a T-bill rate and
lagged S&P returns). Since their sample is not a bucket of homogeneous assets they
also control for asset characteristics. They nd that most of the default correlation
is explained by the observable factors but there is a small, signicant remaining
correlation which is consistent with a common unobserved factor. We tuck all of
the correlation into the unobserved factor, noting that it may be correlated with
observed factors and noting that our assets are considerably more homogeneous.
The main dierence between these specications is that the observable factors are
undoubtably serially correlated (specically the T-bill rate) while we consider an
iid unobservable factor. We doubt that this will make a serious dierence in results
given the small number of defaults we observe, but and extension to correlated
unobservables will be pursued in future work.
3 Prior Distribution I: Low-Default Assets
I have asked an expert to specify a low-default portfolio bucket and give me some as-
pects of his beliefs about the unknown default probability. The portfolio consists of
7loans to highly-rated, large, internationally active and complex banks. The concern
here is that the frequency estimator, which is the maximum likelihood estimator
(MLE), will be zero for low-default portfolio segments in banks that have not ex-
perienced recent defaults in this safe portfolio segment. Responses to this diculty
range from serious technical, though ad hoc, adjustments such as increasing the
MLE by an amount depending on sample size and the desired measure of conser-
vatism, Pluto and Tasche (2005), mysticism such as ill-dened "mapping exercises,"
and simple desperation - searching for a defaulted asset which can be opportunis-
tically reclassied into the portfolio segment lacking default experience. None of
these procedures are coherent. The problem is recognized by the Basel Committee
and industry experts. Newsletter No. 6 (Basel Committee on Banking Supervi-
sion (2005)) was written by the Basel Committee Accord Implementation Group's
Validation Subgroup in response to banking industry questions and concerns re-
garding portfolios with limited loss data. The newsletter is notable for suggesting
other sources of information and not advocating a technical "x," but it does not
go so far as to suggest an explicitly Bayesian approach. The Bayesian formalism is
coherent and provides a natural framework for incorporating expert information.
The elicitation method included a specication of the problem and some spe-
cic questions over e-mail followed by a discussion. Elicitation of prior distribu-
tions is an area that has attracted attention. General discussions of the elicitation
of prior distributions are given by Kadane, Dickey, Winkler, Smith, and Peters
(1980), Garthwaite, Kadane, and O'Hagan (2005), O'Hagan, Buck, Daneshkhah,
Eiser, Garthwaite, Jenkinson, Oakley, and Rakow (2006) and Kadane and Wolfson
(1998). An example assessing a prior for a Bernoulli parameter is Chaloner and
Duncan (1983). Chaloner and Duncan follow Kadane et al in suggesting that as-
sessments be done not directly on the probabilities concerning the parameters, but
on the predictive distribution. That is, questions should be asked about observables,
to bring the expert's thoughts closer to familiar ground. Departures from this pre-
dictive distribution indicate prior knowledge. In the case of a Bernoulli parameter
and a 2-parameter beta prior, Chaloner and Duncan suggest rst eliciting the mode
of the predictive distribution for a given n (an integer), then assessing the relative
probability of the adjacent values ("dropos"). Graphical feedback is provided for
renement of the specication. Examples given consider n=20. Gavasakar (1988)
suggests an alternative method, based on assessing modes of predictive distribu-
tions but not on dropos. Instead, changes in the mode in response to hypothetical
8samples are elicited and an explicit model of elicitation errors is proposed. The
method is evaluated in the n=20 case and appears competitive. Graphical feedback
is provided for renement of the specication. The suggestion to interrogate experts
on what they would expect to see in data, rather than what they would expect of
parameter values, is appealing but was not particularly convenient for our experts.
It is necessary to specify a period over which to dene the default probability.
The "true" default probability has probably changed over time. Recent experience
may be thought to be more relevant than the distant past, although the sample pe-
riod should be representative of experience through a cycle. It could be argued that
a recent period including the 2001-2002 period of mild downturn covers a modern
cycle. A period that included the 1980's would yield higher default probabilities,
but these are probably not currently relevant. The default probability of interest is
the current and immediate future value, not a guess at what past estimates might
be. There are 50 or fewer banks in this highly rated category, and a sample period
over the last seven years or so might include 100 observations as typical or 300
observations as a very high value.
We began by considering rst the method suggested by Chaloner and Duncan
(1983) in an application involving larger probabilities and smaller datasets. For the
predictive distribution on 300 observations, the modal value was zero defaults. Upon
being asked to consider the relative probabilities of zero or one default, conditional
on one or fewer defaults occurring, the expert expressed some trepidation as it is
dicult to think about such rare events. Our expert had diculty thinking about
the hypothetical default experiences and their relative likelihoods. The expert was
quite happy in thinking about probabilities over probabilities, however. This may
not be so uncommon in this technical area, as practitioners are accustomed to
working with probabilities. The minimum value for the default probability was
0.0001 (one basis point). The expert gave quantiles of the distribution of the default
probability. A useful device here is to think about equiprobable events, leading
naturally to assessment of the median value, and then conditionally equiprobable
events, leading to the quartiles. Finer quantiles are a little more dicult, though risk
managers are used to thinking about tail events. On the rst round of questioning,
the expert reported 0, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.90, and 1.0 quantiles as 0.0001, 0.00225,
0.0033, 0,025, 0.035, and 0.05.. Our expert found it much easier to think in terms of
quantiles than in terms of moments. I have seen this in many related applications
as well.
9The next step is to represent the expert's assessments with a statistical distri-
bution. A usual approach is to t a parametric form, perhaps the conjugate form,
to the elicited beliefs. That approach was taken by Kiefer (forthcoming) using a
Beta distribution on a truncated support. Here we take the approach that as little
"information" as possible not supplied by the expert should be introduced by the
specication of the functional form of the distribution. Of course, additional infor-
mation is introduced: a distribution for a continuous variable species an innity of
probabilities. Nevertheless, care can be taken to make the specication as benign as
possible. We do this by specifying a distribution with maximum entropy (minimum
information) subject to the constraint that the distribution match the properties
oered by the expert. The entropy of a distribution p(x) or of the random variable
X is a measure of the information value of an observation, in the sense that one
can be much more certain about the likely value of a draw from a distribution with
low entropy than from a distribution with high entropy. Entropy is




The denition is most intuitive for a discrete random variable and extends to con-
tinuous or mixed variables by direct denition or by taking discrete approximations
and limits. Entropy is sometimes written with the random variable X as an ar-
gument and sometimes with the distribution p as an argument. Of course, it is a
function of the distribution and not the realization of the random variable. Chang-
ing the base of the logarithm (multiplying all evaluations by a constant factor)
changes the physical interpretation slightly but does not change the results we will
be using. Entropy using the base 2 log can be interpreted as the expected number
of binary questions ("is x < a") necessary to nd the value of the realization. The
base 2 log is extremely useful for coding results. This interpretation is not as com-
pelling in the continuous case of "dierential entropy," which can be negative. For
continuous distributions it is often useful to use natural logs. Further discussion
from the information theory viewpoint can be found in Cover and Thomas (1991)
and from the statistical viewpoint in Jaynes (2003).
The entropy approach provides a method to specify the distribution that meets
the expert specications and otherwise imposes as little additional information as
possible Thus, we maximize the entropy in the distribution subject to the con-
10straints indexed by k given by the assessments. Since we are looking for continuous












Proceeding purely formally, form the Lagrangian with multipliers k and  and
dierentiate with respect to p(x) for each x, obtaining the FOC
 ln(p(x))   1 +
X
k
kck(x) +  = 0
or




a very strong result giving the functional form of the maximum entropy distribution
satisfying the given constraints. The multipliers are chosen so that the constraints
are satised. The intuitive approach taken here provides the correct answer; for
details see Csiszar (1975), Theorem 3.1. This functional form result is attributed
to Boltzmann.
In our application the assessed information consists of quantiles. The constraints
are written in terms of indicator functions for the k quantiles qk, for example the
median constraint corresponds to c(x) = I(x < median) 0:5. Thus the functional
form for the prior density on  is
pME() = k expf
X
k
k(I( < qk)   k)g (9)
This is a piecewise uniform distribution for :
It can be argued that the discontinuities in the ME densities are unlikely to
re
ect characteristics of expert information. Although quantiles can be specied,
perhaps it also makes sense to argue that the densities should be smooth. Smooth-
11ing was accomplished using the Epanechnikov kernel with several bandwidths h
chosen to oer the experts choices on smoothing level (including no smoothing).




K(u)pME( + u=h)du (10)
with K(u) = 3(1   u2)=4 for  1 < u < 1: Since the density is dened on bounded
support there is an endpoint or boundary "problem" in calculating the kernel-
smoothed density estimator. Specically, pS() as dened in 10 has larger support
than pME(), moving both endpoints out by a distance 1=h: We adjust for this using
re
ection, pSM() = pS() + pS(a   ) for a   < a + 1=h; pSM() = pS() for
a + 1=h   < b   1=h; and pSM() = pS() + pS(2b   ) for b   1=h    b: The
resulting smoothed density has support on [a;b] and integrates to 1. See Schuster
(1985).
Figure 1 reports the maximum-entropy representation of the prior as initially
elicited. This representation, together with the calculation of the implied mean of
0.012, were returned to the expert for discussion and reconsideration. The increase
in density moving to the right was not a good re
ection of the expert's assessments.
What was desired was a longer right tail but with less density. The expert reassessed
the quantiles and added an assessment of the 95th percentile. The results for quan-
tiles 0, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.90, 0.95, 0.99, and 1.0 are 0.0001, 0.00225, 0.0033, 0.0125,
0.0205, 0.0255, 0.035 and 0.05. The resulting ME distribution for the low-default
(LD portfolio) is also shown in Figure 1. I have found it useful in this and other ap-
plications to assess quantiles and feed back not only the distribution in a graph but
the calculated moments. It is very dicult to think about the relationship between
tail behavior and moments, especially for higher order moments. Further, feeding
back the ME distribution allows the expert to see implications which may not be
apparent after a functional form is t. This method allows the expert to reassess
in the light of the implications of quantile assessments for moments. This leads
to sharper assessment of quantiles. Finally, various smoothed versions of the ME
representation were fed back to the expert. This expert preferred the smooth rep-
resentation with a minimal amount of smoothing (h = 600): The resulting smooth
prior is also shown in Figure 1.












With the likelihood 2 and prior at hand inference is a straightforward application
of Bayes rule. Given the distribution p() obtained from our expert, we obtain the
joint distribution of r, the number of defaults, and  :
p(r;) = p(rj)p()




and divide to obtain the conditional (posterior) distribution of the parameter of
interest  :
p(jr) = p(rj)p()=p(r) (12)
13Similarly, if we turn to the model with heterogeneity and data R = (r1;r2;:::rn) we
nd use the likelihood 6 and nd the posterior distribution
p(jR) = p(Rj)p()=p(R)
Given the distribution p(jr), we might ask for a summary statistic, a suitable
estimator for plugging into the required capital formulas as envisioned by Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (2006). A natural value to use is the posterior
expectation,  = E(jr): The expectation is an optimal estimator under quadratic
loss and is asymptotically an optimal estimator under bowl-shaped loss functions.
An alternative, by analogy with the maximum likelihood estimator b , is the posterior
mode

. As a summary measure of our condence we would use the posterior




: By comparison, the usual approximation to
the standard deviation of the maximum likelihood estimator is b  =
q
b (1   b )=n:
The posterior distributions for n = 100 and r = f0;1;2g are given in Figure
2 for the simple binomial specication. This might correspond to experience with
20 loans/year over the last 5 years, the minimum number of periods required by
B2. Zero defaults is the most typical experience for these portfolios with this small
sample size.
In this case the likelihood (1   )n is smoothly and rapidly decreasing from
its mode at  = 0: The low- maximum at about  = 0:00025 in the posterior
for r = 0 is a result of the rapidly declining likelihood combined with the prior
which has sharply increasing mass beginning at  = 0:0001: After that point, the
shape of the prior begins to dominate as the likelihood declines smoothly, leading to
another, higher, maximum at around  = 0:0025: This shape, which is informative
about the relative contribution of the likelihood and the prior, is not attainable
under the conjugate prior. Indeed, the extent to which the conjugate prior imposes
a straightjacket on information processing is not adequately appreciated. In the
r = 1 case the prior and likelihood largely agree and the posterior has a single
maximum. For r = 2 we again see the two maxima, indicating some disagreement
between the data and expert information. Summary statistics for these distributions
are reported below.
For comparison, results for n = 300 and r = f0;1;2;5g are reported in Figure














Again we see the low maximum at about  = 0:00025 when r = 0; re
ecting the
strong tendency toward  = 0 in the data information. In this case that maximum
is indeed the mode. For r = 1 and r = 2 the situation is more clear; the data
and expert are in reasonably close agreement. The spread out distribution for the
r = 5 case - the density is essentially 
at between 0.011 and 0.02 - re
ects increased
uncertainty when combining the unexpected data and the expert information.
Results for the model with correlated observations are given in Figure 4 for
n = 100 and r = f0;1;2g and observations distributed equally over 5 years There
are two cases to consider for r = 2; the case with defaults in the same period and
with defaults in dierent periods. This distinction does not matter of course for the
simple Binomial model. Here, the dierence in the posterior distributions is trivial
and not distinguishable in the graphs so only one case is graphed. The summary
statistics are slightly dierent as reported below. With correlation the data are
less informative (note the dierence in vertical scale). The unlikely experience of 2
defaults results again in a spread out posterior indicating ambiguity resulting from
a disagreement between data and expert information.
Results for n = 300 and r = f0;1;5g are shown in Figure 5. The gure shows











































2 extreme cases for 5 defaults, in 5 separate years (graph 5a) and all in the same
year (5b). For r = 0 and r = 1 the posterior densities are concentrated around the
unique maximum though both cases exhibit a substantial right tail. For r = 5 a
highly unlikely realization for this portfolio segment, the data and prior information
dier and this is re
ected in spread-out posterior densities.
Table 1 gives summary statistics for the prior and posterior distributions. The
MLE is given for comparison; clearly this is unacceptable in the zero default case
with the Binomial specication, both as a matter of logic and a matter of regulation.
The posterior mode for n=300 and zero defaults occurs near the origin, re
ecting
the combination of the prior with the likelihood rapidly declining from zero (re-
call the prior support begins at 0.0001). Thus the mode, sometimes advocated as
a computationally convenient alternative to the expectation, does not summarize
well the information in the posterior and is probably not a satisfactory alterna-
tive to the expectation (though it is more acceptable than the MLE). The MLE is
nonzero in the correlated default case even for zero experienced defaults. With the
correlated default specication the inference about the long-run default probability
tends toward larger values when defaults are clumped within a period relative to
evenly distributed defaults. This is indicated not only in the posterior means but
17in the posterior modes and the MLEs as well. Note that in all specications the
posterior mean is greater than the mode, re
ecting the long right tail in the prior
and posterior. The MLE is also greater than the posterior mode except in the case
of zero defaults.
18Table 1: Default Probabilities - Location and Precision
r n 

 b   b 
Binomial Model
0 100 0.0041 0.0021 0.0000 0.0046 0 (!).
1 100 0.0093 0.0027 0.0100 0.0073 0.0099
2 100 0.0151 0.0114 0.0200 0.0081 0.0140
0 300 0.0020 0.0003 0.0000 0.0020 0.0000
1 300 0.0040 0.0024 0.0033 0.0033 0.0033
2 300 0.0067 0.0030 0.0067 0.0048 0.0047
5 300 0.0157 0.0117 0.0167 0.0058 0.0074
Correlated Defaults
0 100 0.0051 0.0022 0.0018 0.0056 0.0298
1 100 0.0099 0.0026 0.0105 0.0079 0.0298
2(same t) 100 0.0149 0.0033 0.0213 0.0474 0.0086
2(di t) 100 0.0143 0.0032 0.0198 0.0439 0.0086
0 300 0.0032 0.0021 0.0018 0.0034 0.0063
1 300 0.0054 0.0024 0.0035 0.0051 0.016
5(same t) 300 0.0168 0.0117 0.0204 0.0077 0.0629
5(di t) 300 0.0138 0.0111 0.0146 0.0075 0.0471
5 Prior Distribution II: Mid-Portfolio Assets
I have asked a dierent expert to consider a portfolio bucket consisting of loans that
might be in the middle of a bank's portfolio. These are typically commercial loans
to unrated companies. If rated, these might be about S&P Baa or Moody's BBB.
The method included a specication of the problem and some specic questions
followed by a discussion. Again, our expert found it easier to think in terms of
the probabilities directly than in terms of defaults in a hypothetical sample. This
may not be so uncommon in this technical area, as practitioners are accustomed
to working with probabilities. The mean value was 0.01. The minimum value for
the default probability was 0.0001 (one basis point). The expert reported that a
value above 0.035 would occur with probability less than 10%, and an absolute upper
bound was 0.3. The upper bound was discussed: the expert thought probabilities in
the upper tail of his distribution were extremely unlikely, but he did not want to rule
out the possibility that the rates were much higher than anticipated (prudence?).













Quartiles were assessed by asking the expert to consider the value at which larger
or smaller values would be equiprobable given the value was less than the median,
then given the value was more than the median. The median value was 0.01. The
former was 0.0075. The latter, the .75 quartile, was assessed at .0125. The expert
seemed to be thinking in terms of a normal distribution, perhaps using informally
a central limit theorem combined with long experience with this category of assets.
Fitting the ME distribution to these values result in a distribution with mean 0.04,
re
ecting the uniform distribution of mass along the long upper tail. After feedback,
the expert reconsidered and added a 0.99 quantile at 0.02. The other assessed
quantiles remained the same. The result is to split the long upper tail so that 0.24
of the mass lies between 0.0125 and 0.02, and the remaining 0.01 of the mass is
distributed over 0.02 to 0.3. The distribution is shown in Figure 6 together with
the smoothed version. The constant density between 0.0075 and 0.0125 re
ects two
assessments; the 25th and 75th percentile points are symmetric around the median.
This expert preferred more smoothing, choosing h = 200.
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Figure 7: Mid-Portfolio Posteriors
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The mid-portfolio applications will typically have a larger sample size as well as a
higher default probability than the low-default application. Thus it is more dicult
to study a "typical" sample, as above. Further, the larger sample and higher ex-
pected default rate may support the correlated default specication in which case
the pattern of defaults over time is important and it is dicult to think of typical
samples. We construct a hypothetical bucket of mid-portfolio corporate bonds from
S&P-rated rms in the KMV North American Non-Financial Dataset. Default rates
were computed for cohorts of rms starting in September 1993 and running through
September 2004. In total there are 2197 asset/years of data and 20 defaults, for
an overall empirical rate of 0.00913. The posterior densities for the Binomial and
correlated models are shown in Figure 7.
The densities have a single maximum and the default probability is well deter-
mined. The model allowing correlated defaults does not give as sharp an inference
of course, but seems to tell the same story. The Binomial model gives slightly lower
estimates of the long-run default probability than the model with correlated de-
faults. In this sample, the posterior mode and the MLE coincide. The posterior
21expectation is greater than the MLE, re
ecting the in
uence of the long right tail.
The expert information is more important in the correlated default model, as re-

ected in the dierence between the posterior standard deviation and the standard
deviation of the MLE (note that these are often compared but in fact have quite
dierent interpretations).
Table 2: Default Probabilities - Mid-Portfolio Application


 b   b 
Binomial Model
0.0096 0.0091 0.0091 0.0019 0.0020
Correlated Defaults
0.0107 0.0096 0.0096 0.0033 0.0191
We estimated this model using direct numerical integration (with MathematicaTM
6.0). Estimation of much more complicated models is now straightforward us-
ing Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) and related procedures (see Robert and
Casella (2004) and Geweke (2005)).
7 Inference for minimum required capital
The default probabilities are used to calculate minimum capital requirements under
Basel II. To this end, an estimate is plugged into a formula given by the authorities
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), p. 64 as
K() = [LGD  [(1   ())
 1=2  
 1() + (()=(1   ()))
1=2  
 1(0:999)]
   LGD]  (1   1:5  b)
 1  (1 + (M   2:5)  b)
where b = (0:11852 0:05478 ln())2 is a maturity adjustment, () from 5 is an
adjustment for correlation among defaults, LGD is loss given default and K() is the
capital requirement (a fraction). In our calculations we take LGD=1. In practice
LGD is another parameter to be estimated and inserted into the equation. Note
that the capital requirement function exhibits a singularity at  =2.9272x10 6: The
limit from the right is +1, from the left -1. It is unlikely that this would come up
in ordinary calculations to the usual levels of numerical accuracy, but it is something
to be aware of since extensive simulations are sometimes used in applications and
22a low-probability realization could dramatically in
uence results. In practice, there
is a lower bound of 0.0003 on the estimate of  to be used in the capital formula
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), p. 67). In the calculations below
we impose the restriction, so the actual capital function is K(0:0003) for  < 0:0003
and K() otherwise. This function is not concave for low values of ; although it is
concave for values above three basis points.
Although the regulations specify that an estimate of the default probability will
be plugged into the formula, we have more than a point estimator available, we
have a complete probabilistic description of the uncertainty in : This implies a
probability distribution for required capital K() by a simple change of variable.
If the formula is viewed as relevant for the true default probability, then it may
arguably be more appropriate to calculate capital by EK() than by K() where
 is some point estimate of : The natural estimate to use is E(); so the issue is
whether to use EK() or K(E()): Since the bulk of the mass of the distribution
of  occurs where K is concave, the rst calculation gives smaller values of required
capital. The implications of this consideration for the choice of portfolio buckets
are explored by Kiefer and Larson (2004) from a sampling point of view.
In the mid-portfolio application we have K(E()) = 0.1617 and EK() =
0.1603 in the Binomial case and K(E()) = 0.1681 and EK() = 0.1651 in the
correlated default case. The larger dierence in the correlated case re
ects the
higher uncertainty. Apparently banks desiring lower capital positions would prefer
increased uncertainty for this calculation, though for internal business analytics (for
example, in pricing credit) increased precision is naturally preferred. This perverse
incentive points to the need to think clearly about the losses associated with mis-
specifying minimum regulatory capital. It is likely that a quadratic loss function, or
something quite like quadratic loss, leading to the mean as an optimal estimator, is
inappropriate here. Perhaps losses associated with getting capital too low, leading
to increased risk of default by the bank, is substantially worse than getting capital
too high, leading to reduced prots by the bank. Partial evidence on this score
is provided by the fact that banks, who may favor prots over safety more than
supervisors, routinely hold more than the minimum required capital.
We address this possibility by considering loss functions of the form bH(k  
k0)   aH(k0   k) where H(w) is the Heaviside function H(w) = 0 for w < 0 and
H(w) = 1 for w  0; a piecewise linear loss function. Minimizing expected loss
gives capital K = F  1(a=(a + b)) where F is the posterior distribution function.
23We expect that a > b, though quantitative considerations of the loss are dicult
and are not given in B2. For a=(a+b) = (1=2;2=3;3=4) the optimal values of capital
are (0.165, 0.173, 0.178) in the correlated default case and (0.161, 0.166, 0.168) for
the Binomial specication. Here the gains associated with increased precision are
clear.
8 Conclusion
I have considered inference about the default probability for a low-default portfolio
bucket and for a mid-portfolio bucket. For low-default portfolios or for very new as-
sets there is unlikely to be substantial data information about the long-run default
rate. Nevertheless banks must make credit allocation decisions and those banks
governed by the Basel II regulations must estimate default probabilities and justify
their estimation procedures to supervisors. Expert judgment is expected though the
B2 regulations do not explicitly recommend quantication of expert information in
probability terms. If this information can be quantied in probabilities, then the
information can be combined coherently using the ordinary properties of probabil-
ities. This leads to a tremendous simplication of the numerous and dicult ad
hoc considerations that lead to situation-specic solutions to the inference prob-
lem. An industry expert with long experience with this portfolio segment agreed to
the elicitation. The expert was able to give probabilities for ranges of the default
probability, specifying various percentiles. A maximum entropy approach gave a
statistical representation of the probabilities with as little additional information
as possible. This was a useful device for feeding back implications to the expert
and inducing revisions in the elicited probabilities. A smoothed version of the nal
elicited maximum entropy distribution provided the prior for a Bayesian analysis.
In the low default case, the number of defaults will be small with high probability. I
reported results for sample sizes of 50 and 300, representing the likely range of data.
Though these data sets were hypothetical, they are typical and the results are use-
ful, not least because the embarrassing and unacceptable estimate of a zero default
probability based on the MLE does not arise. In a second application, I interviewed
an expert with wide experience in mid-portfolio assets. The same procedure was
followed: an initial elicitation led to a maximum-entropy distribution, with impli-
cations fed back to the expert for consideration. Then, a smoothed version of the
nal elicitation was used in an analysis. In this application it is more dicult to
24specify a typical dataset. A portfolio consisting of mid-portfolio corporate bonds
was constructed and used in the application.
Two specications were used for the likelihood function, both consistent with
the Basel II model. The rst is a simple Binomial, probably the model in widest use
in practice. This model for defaults is consistent with a model in which asset values
are iid and default occurs when a (lower) threshold is crossed. An extension in
which asset values follow a single factor model consisting of a period-specic shock
common to all assets in the portfolio bucket and an idiosyncratic shock is consistent
with the B2 capital model. This is a richer specication in which period-specic
default rates are essentially inputs to estimating a long-run default rate. As a
consequence, inferences in this expanded model are much less sharp since the data
are less informative. Thus the expert information is particularly valuable. Both
models were estimated for both the low-default application and the mid-portfolio
application. Implications for minimum required capital based on the B2 formulas
and the posterior distribution are explored. At the validation stage, modelers can
be expected to have to justify the likelihood specication and the representation of
expert information. Methods for validation of Bayesian procedures are yet to be
developed.
In this and related applications the econometrician faces the dual chore of model-
ing the data distribution with a specication of a statistical distribution and mod-
eling expert information with a statistical distribution. Adding the latter task
substantially increases the range of applicability of econometric methods. This is
clearly an area for further research.
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